主  题:The effect of Chinese Shadow Banking on Capital Adequacy: Does Corporate Governance matter?

内容简介:This  study examined two issues. First, we proposed the risk-taking  hypothesis to investigate whether a bank that engages in shadow banking  tends to take considerable risks. Second, we examined whether good  corporate governance can enhance or mitigate this effect of shadow  banking on risk-taking. Our sample consists of 59 Chinese banks during  2010 to 2016. We represented shadow banking with three trust beneficiary  rights: financial assets purchased under resale agreements, financial  assets available for sale, and investment securities received. Our  results support the risk-taking hypothesis and the tendency of good  governance to significantly reduce the effect of shadow banking on  risk-taking.

报告人:吴孟纹      副教授

时  间:2018-11-28    13:30

地  点:位育楼117